

Message Text

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3397

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: FRG VIEWS ON OPTION III

REF: STATE 108800 (NOTAL)

1. DURING INITIAL SPC CONSIDERATION OF U.S. PROPOSAL ON OPTION III (SEPTEL) FRG REP (BOSS) READ FOLLOWING TEXT OF FRG VIEWS. FRG PRESENTATION CLOSELY PARALLELS EARLIER FRG PAPER PRESENTED IN DEPARTMENT ON MAY 7 WITH OMISSION OF SPECIFIC FRG QUESTIONS AT END OF THAT PAPER (REF A).

2. BEGIN TEXT:

SPEAKING NOTES

SUBJECT: MBFR, OPTION III

1. THE PRESENTATION OF THE MAERICAN PAPER ON OPTION III MARKS THE BEGINNING OF NATO CONSULTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IN NATO THE IMPORTANT SUBJECT OF THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS INTO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN A MANNER
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WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE WAY IN WHICH WE FORMULATED OUR PRESENT NEGOTIATING POSITION.

2. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT OPTION III IS A SUBSTANTIAL

PACKAGE WHOSE TACTICAL WEIGHT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE. IT REPRESENTS ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL CARDS IN THE HAND OF NATO, AND IT WILL THEREFORE BE NECESSARY TO ORGANIZE OUR TACTICS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THIS CARD BECOMES A TRUMP CARD. THIS REQUIRES THAT OUR POSITION ON OPTION III IS DEVELOPED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WITH ALL DUE CARE AND WITHOUT PRESSURE OF TIME. WITH THIS IN MIND WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO AN EXPEDITIOUS DISCUSSION. THE OPTIMIZATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE OPTION III CARD ALSO REQUIRES THAT WE WOULD USE IT AT THE BEST MOMENT VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER SIDE. IT SEEMS JUSTIFIED TO ASSUME THAT THIS WILL NOT BE BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE AND UNTIL THE PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH SALT II HAVE BEEN SETTLED.

3. LET ME CALL ATTENTION TO SOME PROBLEMS OF A MORE GENERAL NATURE:

IN DEVELOPING OUR POSITION ON OPTION III, WE MUST -IN ADDITION TO THE MILITARY ELEMENTS - BEAR IN MIND THE EMINENTLY POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. THIS SIGNIFICANCE WAS CONVINCINGLY UNDERLINED BY DR. SCHLESINGER IN HIS JUST PUBLISHED REPORT ON "THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE", AND I QUOTE: "US THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES DEPLOYED IN EUROPE HAVE BEEN FOR YEARS A MAJOR SYMBOL OF THE EARNEST US COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON DEFENSE OF THE ALLIANCE. CONSEQUENTLY, POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE MUST BE CAREFULLY EVALUATED FROM BOTH THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE AND WITH AN EYE TO THE MESSAGE THESE CHANGES CONVEY TO ALLIES AND ADVERSARIES ABOUT THE FUTURE US COMMITMENT TO THIS COMMON DEFENSE." WE FULLY AGREE TO THIS STATEMENT. WE MUST TAKE CARE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III DOES NOT SET ANY ERRONEOUS SIGNALS EITHER IN THE WEST OR IN THE EAST, NOR THAT THIS INTRODUCTION IS MISUNDERSTOOD. IN ADDITION TO THE TACTICAL AND THE SUBSTANTIVE POSITION OF NATO WE SHALL, THEREFORE, HAVE TO CONSIDER A SUITABLE PRESENTATION TO THE PUBLIC, A PRESENTATION WHICH IS IN LINE WITH THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OPTION III. I

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SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO DEVELOP A COMMON POSITION ON THIS QUESTION AS WELL.

IT WILL ALSO BE NECESSARY TO KEEP IN MIND AND TO CONSIDER DURING OUR DELIBERATIONS THAT THE JOINTLY DEVELOPED NEGOTIATING POSITION IN THIS QUESTION IS BASED ON A COMMON STRATEGIC CONCEPT WHICH SHOULD NOT ONLY NOT WEAKEN BUT, IF POSSIBLE, STRENGTHEN THE CONCEPTUAL COHESION OF OUR ALLIANCE.

4. WE ARE FACED WITH A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TASK. WE COULD IMAGINE THAT THE FOLLOWING PAPERS SHOULD BE DRAFTED.

- A POSITION PAPER,
- GUIDANCE FOR THE AD-HOC-GROUP,
- A PAPER ON NEGOTIATING TACTICS,

- A PAPER ON THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION.

5. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE AMERICAN PAPER WILL BE THE BASIS OF OUR WORK. THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD IN PARA'S 2 TO 9 OF THE US PAPER CORRESPOND TO OUR ASSESSMENT OF OPTION III.

THIS INCLUDES

- THE PRESENT STAGNATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS,
- THE RECOGNITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF MBFR,
- THE EVALUATION OF THE MAIN DIFFERENCES WITH THE EAST,
- THE ADHERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF PHASING,
- THE ROLE OF OPTION III AS A MAKE-WEIGHT TO ACCOMPLISH THE FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN OBJECTIVES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS;

IN THIS CONTEXT, WE ATTACH SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO A CONCRETE COMMON CEILING AND TO ITS COLLECTIVE CHARACTER.

6 IN FORMULATING OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION, WE SHALL BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:

A) OPTION III WOULD INTRODUCE A QUALITATIVELY NEW ELEMENT INTO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM THIS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED.

B) SUCH CAREFUL ASSESSMENT OF CONSEQUENCES WILL BE NECESSARY PARTICULARLY IN DEVELOPING A NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR PERSHING AND AIRCRAFT. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE EITHER ALREADY DEALT WITH IN THE US PAPER OR REQUIRE ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION:

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- THE SYSTEMS REDUCED UNDER OPTION II SHOULD EXCLUSIVELY BE AMERICAN SYSTEMS;

- THE INTROCUCTION OF OPTION II SHOULD BE A ONE-TIME

OPERATION, AND IT WOULD HAVE TO BE CLEAR THAT IT WILL BE LIMITED TO THE FIRST NEGOTIATING PHASE, THAT IT WILL NOT BE REPEATED IN THE SECOND PHASE AND NOT INCLUDE EUROPEAN SYSTEMS,

- THE CONCENTRATION OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND POSSIBLY AIR FORCE MANPOWER SHOULD BE MAINTAINED,
- THE QUESTION OF THE REDEPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES OF THE WITHDRAWN SYSTEMS SHOULD BE CLEARLY SETTLED WITHIN NATO,
- ANALOGOUS EUROPEAN SYSTEMS SHOULD BE KEPT OUT OF REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS SO AS NOT TO AFFECT FUTURE STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENTS. EVEN A TEMPORARY LIMITATION OF EUROPEAN WEAPON SYSTEMS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO OUR OBJECTIVES, AS IT WOULD HAVE PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS ON PHASE II,
- THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN REDUCTION ARRANGEMENTS CAN, IN OUR OPINION, ONLY BE ENSURED THROUGH SECRET

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A NO-INCREASE FOR THE AGGREGATE GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN PHASE I AND THROUGH THE COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER TO BE COMPLETED IN PHASE II. NON CIRCUMVENTION THROUGH A NO-INCREASE ON EUROPEAN EQUIPMENT WOULD INESCAPABLY HAVE A DETRIMENTAL QUALITATIVE EFFECT ON EUROPEAN FLEXIBILITY,

- THE DEVELOPEMENT OF A EUROPEAN DEFENCE STRUCTURE MUST NOT BE RENDERED MORE DIFFICULT BY THE INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III.

WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE PDATED SHAPE ASSESSMENT OF OPTION III.

C) OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IS AN AGREEMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON WHAT OPTION III S TO BUY:

- AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING AND ITS COLLECTIVE CHARACTER,
- AGREEMENT TO THE REDUCTION OF A TANK ARMY,
- AGREEMENT TO THE PHASING CONCEPT.

AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE IN THE WHOLE NEGOTIATING PROGRAMME OF MBFR. IF IT CAN BE ASSUMED THAT OPTION III IS A ONE-TIME MAKE-WEIGHT, IT IS NATURAL THAT THIS OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE AGREED TO IN AS CONCRETE TERMS AS POSSIBLE IN THE FIRST PHASE. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD ENVISAGE A NUMERICAL DEFINITION OF THE COMMON CEILING AS A NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVE IN THE FIRST PHASE; AT ANY RATE, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD AIM AT MORE CONCRETE LANGUAGE THAN MERE AGREEMENT TO THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING.

D) WE ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO USING OPTION III IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN OPTIMUM EFFECT THIS MEANS THAT UNDESIRABLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT SHOULD BE ENSURED THAT

- CREDIBILITY OF THE WESTERN DETERRENT AND ITS DEFENCE CAPABILITY ARE MAINTAINED,
- THE ADAPTABILITY AND POSSIBILITY OF MODERNISATION OF ALL SYSTEMS OF THE ALLIANCE IS MAINTAINED,
- A QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF THE WEAPON SYSTEMS ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE REDUCTION AREA IS SAFELY EXCLUDED AND THAT STRUCTUREAL AND ORGANIZATINAL CHANGES IN THE FORCES REMAIN POSSIBLE,
- THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS IS NOT AFFECTED.

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E) IN INTRODUCING OPTION III, THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEGATIVE REACTION OF THE EAST TO ITS INTRODUCTION SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. THIS IS DONE IN PARA 21 OF THE AMERICAN PAPER. A CLEAR ALLIANCE POSITION ON THIS POINT IS NECESSARY. ANY EXTENSION OF OPTION III MUST BE EXCLUDED.

F) FINALLY, WE ALSO REGARD IT AS EXTRMELY IMPORTANT THAT ALL ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF OPTION III ARE CLARIFIED IN NATO BEFORE OPTION III IS INTRODUCED IN VIENNA. THIS ALSO INCLUDES THE PROBLEM OF RECIPROCITY WITH ITS DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF DEFINITION AND THE QUESTION OF NON-CIRUCUMVENTION FOR THE EUROPEANS.

7. THE AMERICAN PAPER IS THE RESULT OF INTENSIVE PRLIMINARY STUDIES BY WHICH WE CAN NOW ALL PROFIT. THESE STUDIES WHICH WERE UNDERTAKEN IN THE INTEREST OF ALL OF US DESERVE AND HAVE OUR GRATITUDE. AS WE SEE IT, THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON POSITION ON OPTION III OFFERS US A CHANCE TO PROVE THE VITALITY AND SOLIDARITY OF OUR ALLIANCE.

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